The new Kosovo Security Strategy formulation process

Inclusiveness and transparency

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Executive summary

Kosovo Security Strategy development process has not been inclusive, transparent, and the strategy hasn’t been published even after it was approved. In addition, even the final version of the strategy has been imposed from the Security Advisory Unit of the International Civilian Office. Therefore, the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process has to be inclusive and transparent. Besides the public institutions, civil society, media, independent experts of the field, political parties, and other interested actors should take part in the strategy development process.

The decision 09/67 of the Government of Kosovo approving the Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR), respectively its 1.6 point, defines development of a new Kosovo Security Strategy. SSSR has an organizational structure under the direction of a Steering Committee which is led by the Minister of Kosovo Security Force. Developing the new Kosovo Security Strategy based on this decision, respectively its 1.6 point is against the Constitution of Kosovo, article 127 which defines that Kosovo Security Council (KSC) in cooperation with the President and the Government develops the Kosovo Security Strategy. In addition, this decision is against the Law on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council, respectively article 2.1 which defines that Kosovo Security Council in coordination with the President of Kosovo develops and reviews the Security Strategy which is approved by the Government and submitted to the Assembly for the final approval.

The new Kosovo Security Strategy development process should start after the SSSR process is concluded. The developments of the new Kosovo Security Strategy and SSSR have to be separated processes. Initiating the process should be open and a decision should be taken by the Government, which pursuant to the Constitution and other laws will authorize the Kosovo Security Council to coordinate the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process. U.S. and France are the two countries which represent good examples of an inclusive and transparent National Security Strategy development process.

All regional and most of EU member countries make documents public either in a format of National Security Strategy or in the format of a relevant document for the country’s security and defense. The National Security Strategy is not confidential and is made public as such. Therefore, based also on the Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances, Kosovo Security Strategy will have to be public and easily accessed by all.
1. Introduction

National Security Strategy is the principal strategy on national security which describes how a country provides security for its citizens. All other strategies, such as the strategy fighting against terrorism, organized crime, and defense, are subordinated to the National Security Strategy. In addition, these strategies should make possible the implementation of National Security Strategy. As such, it defines the interests of the country and its position in the international scene, internal and external security environment (such as challenges, risks and threats). Thus, National Security Strategy is an inclusive paper which deals with security and defense aspects of a particular country. However, countries like United Kingdom, France and China do not have a single document, but have formulated defense policies or so called “white papers or livre blanc” which focus more on national defense.\(^1\)

Similar to the importance of the strategy’s content, so it is the development process of that content. In every National Security Strategy development process, an inclusiveness of relevant institutions is necessary. The more inclusive the development process is, the more consensus is built among the relevant actors in a security strategy. Moreover, the more consensual the process is, the easier and coordinated the National Security Strategy implementation process is. Without the implementation part, National Security Strategy will remain a document just in paper without giving the effects what is was developed for.

According to a list of Strategies and Action Plans of the Government of Kosovo,\(^2\) Security Strategy of Kosovo has been approved by the Government in June 2010,\(^3\) followed by the Action Plan for the implementation of that strategy in July 2011.\(^4\) In this meeting it was requested the strategy should be submitted in the Assembly as a strategy and not as a draft law since the paper in the form of the strategy will be more easily changed in the future.\(^5\) Based on the data from the official webpage of the Assembly of

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3. Decision No. 01/129 from the Government’s meeting of 15.06.2010: [http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Vendimet_e_Mbledhjes_se_129-te_te_Qeverise_2010.pdf](http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Vendimet_e_Mbledhjes_se_129-te_te_Qeverise_2010.pdf)
5. In Government’s meeting of 15.06.2010 when the Kosovo Security Strategy was approved, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Bajram Rexhepi requested that the strategy is to be submitted in the Assembly as a strategy and not as a draft law because with the capacity building of KSF and other institutions, the
Kosovo, that strategy is not found among the documents approved in the Assembly, therefore neither the data of approval nor its content is known. In addition, the developing process of the strategy has not been transparent and has been developed without the participation of other non-governmental actors. As a result of the SSSR process and transformation of Kosovo Security Force (KSF) this year, the Government of Kosovo will develop a new Security Strategy for Kosovo.

In this paper, Forum for Security analyses the strategy development process by looking at inclusiveness, duration, and transparency and public debate. The lack of these elements during the present Kosovo Security Strategy development process, and the approach that the new Kosovo Security Strategy is to be developed as part of the SSSR process, are the main points of discussions. Moreover, Forum for Security addresses national security strategy development process by looking at successful examples of certain countries in the world. The aim of this paper is to serve as a discussion paper between the relevant actors in coordinating the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process.

2. Kosovo Security Strategy

With the approval of the Constitution of Kosovo, the drafting and approval process of a certain number of laws which had been foreseen with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement begins. One of these laws was the Law on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council approved in the Assembly in March 2008, which was mandated to also develop the Kosovo Security Strategy. This law defined the establishment of the two supporting bodies of the Kosovo Security Council, the Secretariat and the Situation Center, which later were also defined by the secondary legislation. According to the point 16.4 b), article 16 of the law on the establishment of the KSC, the Secretariat coordinates the development of security strategies and policies in Kosovo. Therefore, based on this legal basis, KSC Secretariat started developing the Kosovo Security Strategy.

As a new and inexperienced institution to coordinate the development of security strategies and policies, the Secretariat started developing itself the Kosovo Security Strategy will be more easily changed compared to a law:

http://www.zhurnal.mk/content/?id=1561013499

6 Law No. 03/L-050 on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council, Article 2.1

7 Law No. 03/L-050 on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council, Chapter III, Article 6.
Strategy without the coordination of relevant security institutions in Kosovo. But, except that the development of the Kosovo Security Strategy was not coordinated with relevant security institutions in Kosovo, the final version of the strategy did not pass without impacts of international community institutions in Kosovo. More concretely, it was the Security Advisory Unit under the Deputy International Civilian Representative which after a period of time imposed the final version of the Kosovo Security Strategy. Furthermore, in addition to this not at all transparent and inclusive process, the strategy is nowhere published after its approval. According to the list of Strategies and Action Plans of the Government of Kosovo mentioned above, all what is known today is that the Office of the Prime Minister is the responsible institution on this strategy.

Originally the structure of the Kosovo Security Council and its supporting bodies was recommended from the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) started in 2005 and concluded in 2006. The ISSR process was initiated from the then Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of United Nations, SorenJessen Petersen, and was guided by the principals and methodology designed by the Security Sector Development Advisory Team. The ISSR was directed by the Steering Group consisting of high representatives from UNMIK, Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), community representatives and the Secretariat, run by a Coordinator. The Secretariat and the Coordinator were placed in the Office for Public Safety established in 2004 as part of the Office of the Prime Minister. As part of this office, with the decision of the then Prime Minister, in autumn 2005, the Situation Center was established mandated to inform the Prime Minister about the security situation in Kosovo. The Situation Center establishment was preceded by the initiative of SRSG Advisory Unit on Security and later helped from the UNMIK Situation Center. Moreover, with the approval of the Law on the establishment of KSC, the Office for Public Safety was in a way substituted by the Secretariat of KSC as a supporting body, while the existing Situation Center became the second supporting body of the KSC. As already mentioned above, these two institutions work according to the law on the establishment of the KSC, and secondary legislation, respectively regulations.

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8 Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), p.136  

9 Office for Public Safety was established on June 30, 2004 with the Administrative Direction No.2004/16  
3. The new Kosovo Security Strategy

Because of the KSF transformation as it is defined with the Comprehensive Proposal on the Kosovo Status Settlement, in April 2012 the Government of Kosovo approved the decision 09/67 to initiate the Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR) process. This process is meant to be a review of the actual security sector in Kosovo and has defined eight stages to go through. According to the abovementioned decision, the process is to be concluded no later than June 2013. However, based on the information presented in the meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of KSF where the Minister for KSF had reported, according to the Minister, only a preliminary report of this process will be prepared in June 2012. Despite that, as the review is going to produce effects for the security sector, a new Kosovo Security Strategy will be in the Government’s agenda.

In the following part of this analysis we will argue about which institution of the Kosovo security sector architecture has to coordinate the new Kosovo Security Strategy formulation process?

According to the present security sector architecture, composition and legal basis, Kosovo Security Council (KSC) is the only institution which is competent in developing the Kosovo Security Strategy. As to the legal basis, Kosovo Security Council and its mandate to develop the security strategy have been firstly referred by the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex VIII, Article 1.4 “Kosovo shall establish a Kosovo Security Council (KSC), reporting to the Prime Minister. The KSC shall develop a security strategy in accordance with this settlement.” In accordance with this disposition, Constitution of Kosovo defined that “in cooperation with the President of the Republic of Kosovo and the Government, KSC develops the security strategy of the Republic of Kosovo”. According to Article 2.1 on the establishment of the KSC “Kosovo Security Council, in coordination with the President of the Republic of Kosovo,

10 Article 5, point 5.3 of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
12 The meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of KSF, date 26.03.2013 when the Minister for KSF reported about the actual situation and objectives of KSF for this year.
develops and reviews the Security Strategy of Kosovo. The Security Strategy of Kosovo is approved by the Government and submitted to the Assembly for the final approval”.

Based on this, the point 1.6 of the decision 09/67 on the development of a new Security Strategy for Kosovo is against the Article 127 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, and Article 2, point 2.1 of the Law on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council.

With regard to its composition, KSC has an almost ideal composition to coordinate the development process of the new Kosovo Security Strategy, because it assembles representatives of key security sector institutions in Kosovo. According to the law, the KSC has the authority and composition which change depending on the situation in Kosovo, normal and state of emergency situations. In normal situations, the KSC is chaired by the Prime Minister and consists of permanent members with executive authority such as: Minister of KSF, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Justice, Minister of Finance, and Minister for Returns and Communities. In addition, in meetings of the KSC take part also other permanent members but in advisory capacity such as: a representative of the President, the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, the Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, General Director of the Kosovo Police, the Commander of the Kosovo Security Force, the Secretary of the Kosovo Security Council, Director of Customs, and the Director of the Agency for Emergency Management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Slightly different with regards to the composition, but important with regards to authority, KSC has executive authority and chaired by the President during the State of Emergency. In general, the KSC has an advisory role on all matters relating to the security of Kosovo and its contribution to regional stability, and is assembled not more than one time in four months. In addition, the KSC has two supporting bodies, the Secretariat and the Situation Center.

Having in mind the authority of the KSC under the Office of the Prime Minister, Kosovo Security Council will have to coordinate the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process. Meetings of the KSC will be chaired by the Prime Minister or by any of the Deputy Prime Ministers while the KSC Secretariat will coordinate the practical aspects of the working groups on behalf of the KSC. However, based in an

15 Article 2, point 2.1 of the Law No. 03/L-050 of the Law on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council.
16 Article 3 of the Law 03/L-050 on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council.
17 Articles 12 and 13 of the Law 03/L-050 on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council.
18 Articles 16 and 17 of the Law 03/L-50 on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council.
organizational structure of the KSC supporting bodies,\textsuperscript{19} it is clearly noticed that the Secretariat needs a department which as a primary task will have to coordinate between the relevant Kosovo security sector institutions and agencies in developing the new security strategy. This will make possible a Kosovo Security Council system which will enable an almost ideal coordination of development of the new Kosovo Security Strategy and every other strategy which exceeds the competences of a single Ministry. Similar institutions to Kosovo Security Council exist in many countries in the world, such as in the U.S.,\textsuperscript{20} France, United Kingdom,\textsuperscript{21} Turkey\textsuperscript{22} and Croatia.

4. Important aspects for the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process

Based on examples of other countries with the development of the National Security Strategy, this part will discuss about three important aspects for the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process: duration, inclusiveness, transparency and public debate. Duration of the process is important due to the fact that development of National Security Strategy is not a process which should be done quickly, but a flexible process in time should be designed. Such as process results in a durable strategy which has been developed through an inclusive process of different actors, a process during which there was a good communication between institutions, coordination of activities, and a good cooperation until the strategy is finalized. Discussion of the abovementioned aspects is done by having in mind the Decision 09/67 point 1.6 which defines the development of a new Kosovo Security Strategy along with seven objectives during a time period of one year, and the lack of inclusiveness, transparency and public debate that have been neglected by development process of the Kosovo Security Strategy. These aspects have to be addressed by the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process.

\textsuperscript{19} Annex 1.51 of the Answers to the Questionnaire for the Feasibility Study for the Stabilization and Association Agreement\url{http://www.mei-ks.net/repository/docs/ANNEX_1.51_-Kosovo_Security_Council.pdf}
\textsuperscript{20} National Security Council in U.S. \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cwg/who/nsc}
\textsuperscript{21} National Security Council in the United Kingdom \url{http://old.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/national-security-council}
\textsuperscript{22} National Security Council in Turkey \url{http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/index_en.htm}
4.1. Duration

Except being against the Constitution and Law on the establishment of the KSC, the abovementioned Decision on the SSSR process is not functional as to the duration of the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process too. According to this Decision, among the eight objectives, one of them is the development of the new security strategy while the duration or time to conduct them is March 2012 – June 2013. In addition to the objective 1.6 for the development of the new Kosovo Security Strategy, other objectives are quite ambitious and require more time. Defining the strategic objectives, security and defense policies, defining the strategic environment of Kosovo, risks, threats, and a detailed analysis of actual security related institutions, are just some of those objectives. All these objectives require much more time in order to be well conducted and with professionalism. Thus, looking from the time perspective, since the development of the new Kosovo Security Strategy is to be developed as part of these objectives, we can conclude that it shouldn’t be part of this decision.

With regard to examples or practices of other countries as to how much time they have spent in writing a good National Security Strategy, it is clearly noticed that there is no standard duration which should be applicable in Kosovo. But, a short period of time has no chances to produce a good strategy. For instance, the British Government was massively criticized by a number of commentators for having drafted the 75-pages Strategic Defense and Security Review in not more than five months, while developing the 11-pages NATO Strategic Concept took more than a year.23 But, what can be beneficial for the case in Kosovo is that the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process should be flexible in time, meaning that enough time should be left in order to develop a good strategy. Thus, the strategy should not be developed quickly with the purpose of just having a Kosovo Security Strategy, but its development requires time, good coordination between the relevant institutions, and good communication and cooperation between all parties involved in the process.24

24 Communication, coordination and cooperation are sometimes known as three C-s in the National Security Strategy development process.
4.2. Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness in the National Security Strategy development process is the best way to address security challenges and concerns from all partners in the country level. Also, inputs from non-governmental organizations have to be taken into account and properly addressed. In this way, the new Kosovo Security Strategy should not be written by one or two institutions only, but, the process should be inclusive consisting of institutions from the three branches of power in Kosovo, civil society organizations, academia, and others which can contribute along the process. Inclusiveness will eliminate chances that the strategy will be of one or two security sector institutions, but of the entire security sector as a Kosovo Security Strategy. Moreover, the involvement of political parties in the process where they will contribute along the process will facilitate the approval process in the Assembly.

Contribution of think-tanks in National Security Strategy developing process is very appreciated and important too. For instance, in U.S. the role of think tanks in National Security Strategy development process has been very important for the process during the development of the strategy in 1994. Many of the aspects addressed by the strategy drafted in 1994 were widely discussed and published earlier by certain think-tanks in U.S. The practice of including think-tanks has continued and widened along all periods of National Security Strategy development process in the U.S. Another good example of think-tank involvement is represented in France where in the latest case with the strategy development, a recognized think-tank in France had been part of the Commission which was drafting the strategy.

4.3. Transparency and public debate

Closely linked with the process of different actors involvement in the strategy development process, is transparency and public debate. A transparent development process helps to prevent the interests of individual security institutions and agencies to dominate the final product. Switzerland follows a good example of socio-political
debate about the security strategy document which is then followed by the drafting process of the strategy from the Government. This is a twofold process: first, a broad and inclusive socio-political consultation leading to non-binding report to government with suggestions for the national security strategy; second, drafting by a governmental body that took this document into account when producing its own report.\textsuperscript{29} A public debate can be done by using the internet tools such as forums and media coverage. Such a process helps creating trust between the society and the state especially when dealing with security and defense policies in the country level. At last, security strategies and policies of every country serve as means through which the state describes how it provides security to its citizens, and their development should be very transparent in order to be accepted and considered legitimate by the citizens.

In addition to that, transparency in the case of Kosovo Security Strategy has two aspects: the first aspect is connected to being transparent during the strategy development process, and the second is connected to the final strategy document by making it public.

5. Should National Security Strategy be public?

According to the Law on the Classification of Information and Security Clearances, National Security Strategy does not belong to any of the levels of classified information.\textsuperscript{30}

Based on examples of regional and EU member countries, it is easily noticed that the majority of these countries make public either the National Security Strategy or another country level document about security and defense.

\textsuperscript{29} DCAF Backgrounder, National Security Policy, p.3 \url{http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/National-Security-Policy}

\textsuperscript{30} Law No. 03/L-178 on Classification of Information and Security Clearances, Article 4\url{http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf}
Table 1: Countries which make public the National Security Strategy or another document relevant to national defense and security.\textsuperscript{31}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Security and Defense Doctrine</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>The Modernization Plan 2000-2015 of the Belgian Armed Forces</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Security Strategy of the Czech Republic</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Danish Defense – Global Engagement</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>National Security Concept</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Security and Defense Policy</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>White paper on defense and national security</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>White paper on German Security Policy and the Future of Bundeswehr</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>White Paper for the Armed Forces</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Strategy Statement</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Strategic Concept</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
<td>2010</td>
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**Regional countries**

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Defense White Paper</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Review</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>White Paper on Defense</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
<td>2009</td>
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\textsuperscript{31} Year as it appears in the document.
6. Practical examples of inclusive consultations during the National Security Strategy development process

As every state acts in a specific context and circumstances, there is not a single model which could be serving as “the best process” to be implemented during the National Security Strategy development process. However, two good examples of inclusive consultations and transparency during the National Security Strategy development process are discussed below.

6.1. United States of America (USA)

A coordination process between institutions in developing the National Security Strategy in U.S. is provided by the National Security Council. This institution is established in 1947 by the National Security Act. Based on this Act, the role of the National Security Council is to advise the President in national security related aspects. Its statutory members are: the President who chairs the National Security Council, Vice President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency. But, in policy development process, and National Security Strategy, other key departments involved in the process are: the State Department, Defense Department, Intelligence Community and Homeland Security Department. In addition to that, the Congress, think-tanks, interest groups and the media are involved in the national security community and impact the National Security Strategy development process.

From other countries examples too, U.S. represents the country which follows an inclusive and transparent National Security Strategy development process. The role of the National Security Council is central providing a place for the good coordination of all relevant actors in this process and in the entire development of policy cycle. In addition to that, a high important role is also played by think-tanks which are specialized in the national security field. In addition to other aspects, the aspect of National Security Strategy development process in U.S. can be qualified transparent and associated with a big debate connected to country’s interests, strategic

environment, and risks and threats considered for the country. U.S. provides a good example in this aspect for many developed countries in Europe, too.

6.2. France

France represents another good example of an inclusive and transparent development process of the “White Paper for the defense and national security” (“Livre blanc sur la défense et sécurité nationale”). In 2007, the President of France established a special Commission for the development of this document, where except representatives of relevant governmental institutions, parliamentarians, qualified individuals from academia, think-tanks and independent experts have taken part in the process. Different from the past experience, the Commission organized TV debates with wide coverage and online hearings of 52 personalities from 14 different countries. Except that, the Commission had created an official webpage where the concerned people could sent their suggestions and proposals about certain aspects of the strategy document. The document being updated in 2007-2008 in France was written in 1994. The reality in 1994 was different and the document was based in a security environment mainly emerging from the Cold War era. As such, this document was not able to address the security challenges emerging from the globalization process and other security challenges which impact the security strategy document. Therefore, the strategy document was updated in 2007-2008 and has been designed in such a way that will be relevant for the 15 years to come. Based on this, if there won’t be any significant and unexpected development, France has a contemporary paper on defense and national security which will be consistent with security challenges until 2023.

36 One of the members in the Commission was the Director of a recognized think-tank in France, namely French Institute for International Relations.
Conclusion and recommendations

As discussed above, the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process has to be inclusive, transparent and in addition to public institutions, civil society organizations, the media, independent experts and other interested parties, have to take part in the process. Based on the institutional architecture of the security sector in Kosovo and legal basis, Kosovo Security Council (KSC) represents the institution which will have to coordinate the development process of the strategy. The process will have to be based upon the principles of inclusiveness, communication, coordination, and cooperation with all public and private relevant actors for the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process. Such as process will make the development process transparent and will facilitate the implementation part of the strategy. The more inclusive the process will be, the more consensus will be found upon the content of the strategy, and easier the implementation process will be too.

Also, the majority of regional and EU member countries have made public either the National Security Strategy or another relevant document for the defense and national security. If the new Kosovo Security Strategy will be containing information or sensitive data, then these should be left as parts of other strategies in order not to make the security strategy being considered as confidential. Only not democratic countries in the world do not make such strategies public. Among the successful examples, U.S. and France represent the two countries which follow an inclusive and transparent process, and have made possible public debates which helped National Security Strategy development process.

Based on the discussion and conclusion just above, the Forum for Security recommends the following steps:

- The new Kosovo Security Strategy development process should not be part of the Decision 09/67 on the Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR) process;
- In order to have cohesiveness between the SSSR process and strategy development, the Government should draft a decision for the strategy development after the SSSR process is concluded;
- According to the Constitution and the Law on the establishment of the Kosovo Security Council, the Government’s decision for the new Kosovo Security Strategy developing process, will have to appoint the KSC as the necessary institution to coordinate the process of the new Kosovo Security Strategy development process;
• The Government should ensure an inclusive and transparent process where civil society, independent experts, the media and others interested, should take part in the process from the beginning;
• Kosovo Security Council has to appoint an official from the KSC Secretariat who will be responsible for the whole coordination process;
• In the end of the process, the Government should publish Kosovo Security Strategy in order to be easily accessed by the public and all interested parties;
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Forum for Security consists of:

Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ), Institute for Advanced Studies GAP, Institute for Development Policies (INDEP), and Kosovo Law Institute.

The Forum for Security aims to contribute to improve the security environment by promoting effective institutions and policies. The forum serves as a discussion platform among civil society organizations and authorities in Kosovo, and provides possibilities for exchange of experience and lessons on security, regionally and internationally. The Forum for Security brings together the main actors within security and justice, and other relevant sectors with an impact on security and advocates influencing policy development.