

# Did the increase in salaries improve the working dynamics of Municipal Assemblies?



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## Executive Summary

The Law on Salaries in the Public Sector, implemented since 2023, has significantly reshaped the system of financial compensation in the public administration, particularly at the local government level. At its core, the law introduces a coefficient-based salary system in municipalities, where remuneration is determined based on three key elements: the position or function of the employee, the size of the municipality (measured by population), and a distinct treatment for employees in the capital. In the context of municipal assembly members, this reform has resulted in a notable increase in remuneration levels. Prior to the entry into force of the Law on Salaries, assembly members received a base remuneration of 150 euros and an additional 50 euros per session attended, with no differentiation between large, medium, or small municipalities, reflecting a uniform approach. Following the implementation of the law, in the capital Prishtinë/Priština, coefficient 6 corresponds to a salary of 660 euros, while in other municipalities coefficients range from 5.3 to 5.9, creating a tiered system based on municipal size. Under this system, the lowest salary of an assembly member in a smaller municipality reaches 583 euros.

The expectation that higher salaries would lead to increased motivation is reasonable, as financial compensation is considered one of the key factors influencing performance and level of effort. This is particularly relevant for municipal assembly members, given that insufficient remuneration prior to the end of 2022 often required locally elected representatives to engage in additional employment to cover living expenses. In this regard, higher salaries were expected to enable greater focus on institutional responsibilities.

However, the findings suggest that the increase in salaries has not been accompanied by an improvement in the working dynamics of municipal assemblies. Since the salary increase in early 2023, performance indicators show either limited or minimal improvement in some areas, while a decline is observed across most other indicators. The number of municipal assembly meetings across seven municipalities was 81 in 2022, increased to 91 in 2023, and then declined to 85 in 2024. This indicates that while the first year following the salary increase recorded an improvement compared to the baseline year, the trend was not sustained in 2024, when the number of meetings returned to a level similar to 2022. The total duration of meetings also reflects a negative trend. Municipal assemblies in the seven municipalities spent 285 hours in sessions in 2022, approximately 286 hours in 2023, and this figure declined to 271 hours in 2024. Thus, the increase in 2023 was marginal, while 2024 shows a clear decrease in time spent in meetings. At the same time, legislative productivity does not indicate improvement following the salary increase. On the contrary, it shows a decline. In 2022, 26 regulations and 540 decisions were adopted; in 2023, 35 regulations and 477 decisions; while in 2024, only 10 regulations and 442 decisions were adopted.

It should be noted that these are quantitative indicators and do not directly measure the quality of debate, the complexity of agenda items, the impact of decisions on citizens, or the level of preparation of materials. Nevertheless, precisely because these indicators are comparable across years and consistent across municipalities, they provide a valuable overview of the pace of work and the intensity of institutional activity, particularly when assessed in relation to a significant change in remuneration conditions.

## Introduction

The new Law on Salaries in the Public Sector in Kosovo entered into force at the beginning of 2023.<sup>1</sup> One of the most notable changes was the significant increase in the salaries of municipal assembly members, aimed at addressing their long-standing concerns regarding motivation and the effectiveness of this key municipal body. Prior to the entry into force of the new law, municipal assembly members frequently expressed the view that their limited level of engagement in the local legislative process was directly linked to the low level of remuneration they received.<sup>2</sup> This situation created a cycle in which insufficient remuneration led to limited engagement, while low engagement further weakened public perception of municipal assemblies as oversight and decision-making institutions.

Adequate remuneration is generally understood to serve as a key motivational factor that can directly influence the quality and level of engagement of public officials. In the context of the public sector, and particularly in the role of municipal assembly members, this relationship becomes both more complex and more critical. When individuals are elected or appointed to representative positions without adequate compensation, they are often compelled to take on additional employment in order to secure sufficient income to cover their living expenses. As a result, the responsibilities associated with their role as assembly members are frequently deprioritized in relation to daily economic needs. Beyond time constraints, this situation also affects the level of preparation for assembly sessions. The review of documents such as financial reports, development plans, and draft decisions, as well as consultation with the community, require resources and a level of engagement that are difficult to sustain when the representative role remains economically "secondary."

The increase in the remuneration of municipal assembly members has been welcomed, but it has also been accompanied by expectations that it would have a positive impact on the performance of municipal assemblies. As a result, it was anticipated that assemblies would become more active, hold meetings more frequently, and feature more frequent or longer discussions and presentations by assembly members.

The effects of increased remuneration should also be reflected at the level of citizens, who are expected to demand greater accountability from their representatives. At the same time, assembly members themselves are expected to assume greater responsibility in justifying the public investment in their roles. Ultimately, the objective of the salary reform was not merely to increase individual income, but to create conditions for a more functional, accountable, and effective institutional structure.

1 Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo. Law No. 08/L-196 on Salaries in the Public Sector. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/3sn6wxs2>

2 Ekonomiaonline. Kuvendet komunale kërcënojnë me bojkot nëse u zvogëlohen pagat. August 2018. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/296xcsas>

## Methodology

The primary purpose of this report is to provide an objective, data-driven assessment of the impact of increased remuneration on the functioning of municipal assemblies in Kosovo. The central research question guiding this analysis is: Did the increase in remuneration affect the working dynamics of Municipal Assemblies? The answer to this question is based on an assessment of three key indicators:

- 1) Whether the number of meetings held has increased, comparing periods before and after the increase in remuneration,
- 2) Whether the number of acts adopted by Municipal Assemblies, including decisions and regulations, has increased, and
- 3) The duration of meetings before and after the increase in remuneration.

Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources, including: the Law on Salaries in the Public Sector, annual reports of Municipal Assemblies, scheduled meetings and sessions, records of conducted sessions, official Municipal Assembly YouTube pages, session transcripts, and annual municipal performance reports submitted by the Ministry of Local Government Administration. It should be noted that these are quantitative indicators and do not directly measure the quality of debate, the complexity of agenda items, the impact of decisions on citizens, or the level of preparation of materials. Nevertheless, precisely because these indicators are comparable across years, they provide a valuable overview of the pace of work and the intensity of institutional activity, particularly when assessed in relation to a significant change in remuneration conditions.

The period analyzed includes 2022 as the baseline year prior to the salary reform, as well as 2023–2024 as the post-reform period, enabling a clear comparison of changes in performance. The years 2020 and 2021 are not considered indicative, as they were characterized by the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly affected the functioning and operational practices of municipal assemblies.

The report assesses regular meetings, extraordinary meetings, and urgent sessions, but does not include ceremonial or commemorative sessions. It also does not assess the meetings of the two mandatory committees of the municipal assembly, namely the Policy and Finance Committee and the Communities Committee. Representation of assembly members in these committees is remunerated outside the standard salary scheme and, therefore, their exclusion does not affect the reported figures on remuneration levels. The assessment covers seven major municipalities in Kosovo: Prishtinë/Priština, Mitrovicë e Jugut/Južna Mitrovica/Mitrovica South, Prizren, Pejë/Peć, Gjilan, Gjakovë/Đakovica, and Ferizaj/Uroševac. These municipalities were selected due to their size and the higher number of assembly members compared to other municipalities.

This report has several limitations that should be taken into account. The analysis focuses only on seven large municipalities, excluding 31 other municipalities that may exhibit different or unique dynamics. In addition, the report does not assess the individual engagement of municipal assembly members, but rather the performance of assemblies as collective bodies. Furthermore, the period analyzed is relatively short, covering three years, which may not be sufficient to assess long-term effects. Finally, changes in performance may also be influenced by factors other than the increase in remuneration, including political, social, and economic developments, as well as individual circumstances. It should be noted that these are quantitative indicators and do not directly measure the

quality of debate, the complexity of agenda items, the impact of decisions on citizens, or the level of preparation of materials. Nevertheless, precisely because these indicators are comparable across years, they provide a valuable overview of the pace of work and the intensity of institutional activity, particularly when assessed in relation to a significant change in remuneration conditions.

## 1. Treatment of Local Government in the Law on Salaries

The Law on Salaries in the Public Sector, implemented since 2023, establishes remuneration in local government based on three key criteria: the position or function held, the population size of the municipality, and a distinct status granted to the capital.<sup>3</sup>

The law foresees a classification of positions, with their relative importance determined through coefficients, the value of which is set annually by the Law on the Budget. From 2023 until the beginning of 2026, the value of one coefficient was 110 euros.<sup>4</sup> At the top of the hierarchy is the Mayor of the capital, with a coefficient of 15. This position reflects the importance of leadership in the capital, which serves as the political, administrative, and economic center of the state. Below this level, mayors of municipalities are divided into seven categories based on the population size they administer, ranging from a coefficient of 13 for municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants to 11.8 for municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. The difference between the largest and smallest municipality amounts to 1.2 coefficients, which translates into 132 euros per month. This represents a relatively moderate difference and indicates that the law aims to balance the importance of the position regardless of municipal size.<sup>5</sup>

Deputy mayors have a distinct position within this structure, as they are assigned the same coefficients as the chairpersons of municipal assemblies, granting both roles equal institutional value. In the capital Prishtinë/Priština, this position is set at coefficient 11, while in other municipalities the coefficient ranges from 10.6 to 8.4, creating a maximum difference of 242 euros. This represents the largest variation within the same category of positions, indicating that for second-level leadership roles, the size of the municipality plays a more pronounced role in determining remuneration.<sup>6</sup>

Directors of municipal departments represent the executive managerial level, and a different approach is observed in their treatment. Their coefficients range only from 8.3 to 7.7, a difference of 0.6 coefficients, which translates into just 66 euros. This level of standardization indicates that professional and technical work is less differentiated based on the size of the municipality, reflecting the assumption that the expertise and responsibilities of a director are comparable regardless of whether they operate in a large or small municipality. While this approach has its rationale, it creates a paradox when considering the significantly different workload between a municipality with over 100,000 inhabitants and one with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.<sup>7</sup>

3 Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo. Law No. 08/L-196 on Salaries in the Public Sector. Page 21. Annex No. 1.2. - Local Level. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/3sn6wxs2>

4 Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo. Law No. 10/L-001 on Budget Appropriations for the Budget of the Republic of Kosovo for Year 2026. Article 30, p.25. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/44x3syms>

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

Municipal assemblies, as institutions composed of elected representatives of citizens that exercise legislative and oversight functions at the local level, are structured into three hierarchical levels: the chairperson, the deputy chairperson, and assembly members. This structure reflects the varying levels of responsibility and expected contribution associated with each role. As noted, the chairperson of the municipal assembly holds the same coefficient as the deputy mayor, placing this role in a highly significant institutional position. In the capital Prishtinë/Priština, this position corresponds to a remuneration of 1,210 euros, while in other municipalities it ranges from 924 euros to 1,166 euros. The difference of 242 euros between the largest and smallest municipalities is the highest within the entire system, indicating the weight assigned to municipal size when determining remuneration for the leadership of the local legislative body.


Prior to the entry into force of the Law on Salaries, the remuneration of assembly members was based on a simple and uniform structure: 150 euros as a base salary and an additional 50 euros for each session held. This scheme did not differentiate between the capital and smaller municipalities and did not reflect either the size of the municipality or the level of responsibility associated with the role.<sup>8</sup>

Following the entry into force of the Law on Salaries from 2023 onwards, the system shifted to a standardized coefficient-based model, resulting in a notable increase in the minimum level of remuneration and a moderate differentiation across municipalities. In the capital Prishtinë/Priština, coefficient 6 corresponds to a remuneration of 660 euros, while in other municipalities coefficients range from 5.3 to 5.6, creating a tiered structure in which remuneration varies depending on the municipality. Even at the lower end of this system, the minimum remuneration of an assembly member in a smaller municipality reaches 583 euros, indicating that the base level of remuneration has increased significantly compared to the pre-reform period.

Across Kosovo, there are 942 municipal assembly members, with their distribution determined by population size, except in the Municipality of Prishtinë/Priština, where the law stipulates that the Municipal Assembly shall always have 51 seats.<sup>9</sup> Municipal assembly members represent the foundation of the local legislative structure, and their remuneration reflects this institutional role.

<sup>8</sup> Kosovo Corruption Prevention Agency. Asset Declaration Records. Year 2020 and 2021. Structure of asset declaration by municipal assembly members in the seven municipalities covered by the report. Source: <https://apk-rks.net/>

<sup>9</sup> Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo. [Law No.03/L-040 on Local Self-Government](#). Article 36. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/3xry2vmc>


**Figure 1.** Number of seats in Municipal Assemblies by Municipality

Source: GAP Institute, data processed from CEC and MLGA

When analyzing municipal assemblies, the dimensions of representation and legitimacy cannot be overlooked. Citizens elect members of municipal assemblies to represent their interests and to oversee the work of the local executive. Their remuneration should be sufficient to enable them to perform this role independently, without the need to rely on additional sources of income that may create conflicts of interest.


The lowest remuneration in the system is that of an assembly member in a small municipality, amounting to 583 euros. When examining internal remuneration structures within municipal assemblies, a clear pattern of differentiation emerges. In a medium-sized municipality with approximately 40,000 inhabitants, the chairperson of the assembly receives 1,034 euros, the deputy chairperson 726 euros, and an assembly member 616 euros. The difference between the chairperson and an assembly member is 418 euros, a substantial amount representing 67.9 percent more than the remuneration of an assembly member. This gap is 3.8 times larger than the difference between the deputy chairperson and an assembly member, indicating that remuneration is not structured in a linear manner but reflects a pronounced valuation of the chairperson's role. This remuneration structure creates a clear financial incentive for those aspiring to leadership positions within the assembly.

**Figure 2.** Remuneration of Municipal Assembly members following the entry into force of the Law on Salaries



Source: GAP Institute, data processed from the Law on Salaries and population-based distribution for each respective municipality.


**Figure 3.** Remuneration of Municipal Assembly chairpersons and deputy mayors following the entry into force of the Law on Salaries



Source: GAP Institute, data processed from the Law on Salaries and population-based distribution for each respective municipality.

Overall, the total monthly cost for all municipal assembly members at the national level is approximately 580,000 euros, or around 7 million euros on an annual basis.


**Figure 4.** Remuneration of Municipal Assembly members calculated on a monthly basis.



Source: GAP Institute. The calculation of remuneration is based on the coefficient assigned to each municipality, with annual estimates derived from the number of assembly members.


Another aspect that emerges when comparing different municipal positions is how the size of the municipality affects remuneration. For mayors, the maximum difference is 132 euros or 10.2 percent, a moderate variation that suggests the role is considered important regardless of municipal size. For municipal assembly chairpersons, the difference is 242 euros or 26.2 percent, significantly higher, indicating that for this position, municipal size plays a more pronounced role. For directors, deputy chairpersons, and assembly members, the difference is only 66 euros or approximately 8 to 11 percent, reflecting a high degree of standardization. These data indicate that the law does not apply a uniform approach to the impact of municipal size but rather adjusts it according to the nature of the position, assigning greater weight to municipal size for senior political leadership roles than for assembly members.

**Figure 5.** Remuneration of mayors following the entry into force of the Law on Salaries



Source: GAP Institute, data processed from the Law on Salaries and population-based distribution for each respective municipality.

**Figure 6.** Remuneration of municipal department directors following the entry into force of the Law on Salaries



Source: GAP Institute, data processed from the Law on Salaries and population-based distribution for each respective municipality.

## Dynamics of Municipal Assemblies before and after the entry into force of the Law on Salaries

The number and dynamics of sessions of Municipal Assemblies in Kosovo are often adversely affected by a combination of political, administrative, procedural, and social factors. At the political level, party polarization, boycotts, and obstruction, as well as fragile local coalitions, reduce the normal pace of work and shift the focus away from decision-making. Tensions between the Mayor and the Municipal Assembly, particularly in cases where the executive lacks the necessary majority to pass decisions in the assembly, result in fewer sessions, limited debate, and reduced decision-making. In addition, electoral calculations and the use of assembly sessions as platforms for political messaging tend to increase rhetoric while reducing the willingness to compromise, leading to delays or contested decisions.<sup>10</sup>

At the administrative level, a frequent source of challenges is the inadequate or delayed preparation of materials for assembly sessions. When documents are missing or unclear, discussions become unfocused and the likelihood increases that agenda items will be returned for revision or postponed. Limited professional capacities within municipal assembly administrations, the lack of legal and technical expertise, and the poor quality of drafting municipal acts create uncertainty, disputes, and the need for repeated revisions. This slows down the work of the assembly and adversely affects its overall dynamics.<sup>11</sup>

Another key challenge relates to quorum and participation. The absence of assembly members, whether due to objective reasons, inadequate scheduling, parallel engagements, or other motivations, can prevent the holding of sessions or the adoption of decisions. When such absences are not accompanied by political or ethical consequences, a culture may emerge in which sessions are treated as a matter of formality rather than as a genuine forum of governance. This undermines the seriousness of deliberation and reduces the overall effectiveness of the assembly's work.<sup>12</sup>

Institutional culture and interpersonal relations also play a significant role. Personal conflicts, unprofessional conduct, interruptions, insults, or verbal pressure undermine the working environment and make it difficult to maintain a focus on substantive issues. These challenges are compounded by factors related to the legal and oversight framework. Normative ambiguities, frequent changes in instructions, or uncertainty arising from legal disputes can slow down decision-making and make it more cautious, in some cases leading to gridlock. Finally, infrastructure and logistics, including municipal hall conditions, audio and video systems, documentation processes, digital distribution of materials, and technical challenges in hybrid formats, can reduce the quality of debate and increase interruptions. External events such as emergencies, protests, local tensions, or highly sensitive issues related to property and urban planning tend to disrupt the calendar and increase levels of conflict, adversely affecting both the frequency and the dynamics of sessions.

Municipal Assemblies are the highest representative bodies at the municipal level and perform primarily normative, decision-making, and oversight functions in

10 Koha. Tensione në mbledhjen e Kuvendit Komunal të Prishtinës. October 2023. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/48eatdab>

11 Koha. Ekzekutivi në Malishevë konteston ligjshmërinë e themelimit të KPF-së. March 2018. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/ythzë69s>

12 Local TV station in Gjilan/Gnjilane. Probleme teknike në seancën e Kuvendit Komunal. February 2026. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/bdeuhvk6>

relation to local policies. The assembly represents the citizens of the municipality and sets local development priorities by adopting policies and general acts that regulate matters of public interest within the municipality. Within this framework, the assembly adopts the Municipal Statute and various municipal regulations, and typically reviews and approves planning and development documents, including strategies and plans related to development and spatial planning.<sup>13</sup>

A core area of responsibility of the Municipal Assembly relates to local public finances. The assembly adopts the municipality's annual budget and, in accordance with applicable rules, approves major in-year revisions, while exercising oversight over budget implementation through reporting and accountability mechanisms. The assembly also decides on municipal revenue policies, including local fees and charges. In addition, the Municipal Assembly plays an important role in overseeing and holding the municipal executive accountable, including the Mayor and municipal departments. This is conducted through plenary sessions, debates, inquiries and questions, and requests for information and reports, as well as through assembly committees that address specific sectors. The assembly reviews performance reports, financial reports, and audit findings when submitted, and may request corrective measures where implementation gaps or issues are identified. Within its competencies, the assembly also addresses matters related to municipal property and assets, taking decisions on policies and their use or management in accordance with applicable legal procedures and constraints.<sup>14</sup>

The Municipal Assembly may authorize and approve cooperation agreements, including inter-municipal cooperation, particularly in cases involving joint projects or services that have a regional rationale. An important dimension of its work is also citizen participation, through public hearings and consultations, as well as through addressing the concerns of citizens, businesses, and other stakeholders. In this way, the Municipal Assembly serves as a key mechanism for representation and democratic oversight at the local level.<sup>15</sup>

Data on the number of meetings held in seven municipalities (Prishtinë/Priština, Prizren, Mitrovicë e Jugut/Južna Mitrovica/Mitrovica South, Pejë/Peć, Gjilan, Gjakovë/Đakovica, and Ferizaj/Uroševac) indicate an overall increase from 2022 to 2023, followed by a slight decline in 2024, without returning to the 2022 baseline level. Specifically, Prishtinë/Priština increased from 12 meetings held in 2022 to 17 in 2023, while in 2024 it held only 14 such meetings. This suggests that immediately following the period in which remuneration increased, Prishtinë/Priština recorded the strongest rise in the number of meetings, although this increase was not sustained in 2024. Prizren held 14 meetings in 2022, 16 in 2023, and 14 in 2024, indicating a modest increase followed by a return to the initial level. Similarly, Mitrovicë e Jugut/Južna Mitrovica/Mitrovica South increased from 12 to 13 and then declined to 10, suggesting that 2024 recorded fewer meetings than even 2022. Pejë/Peć held 11 meetings in both 2022 and 2023, followed by an increase to 13 in 2024, indicating a delayed improvement. Gjilan/Gnjilane recorded 9 meetings in both 2022 and 2023, followed by a significant increase to 13 in 2024, while 2023 showed no change. Gjakovë/Đakovica held 11 meetings in both 2022 and 2023, but declined to 9 in 2024, reflecting a negative trend in the final year. Ferizaj/Uroševac increased from 12 to 14 and then returned to 12.

<sup>13</sup> Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo. [Law No.03/L-040 on Local Self-Government](https://tinjurl.com/3xy2vmc). Article 40. Source: <https://tinjurl.com/3xy2vmc>

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

This indicator shows that in four out of the seven municipalities analyzed, the number of meetings held in 2024 was either lower or the same as in 2022, thus not reflecting an overall increase in the working dynamics when measured through this indicator.

**Table 1.** Number of Municipal Assembly meetings in seven municipalities by year, 2022–2024


Municipality	2022	2023	2024	2024 vs. 2022
Prishtinë/Priština	12	17	14	increase ▲
Prizren	14	16	14	no change
Gjilan/Gnjilane	9	9	13	increase ▲
Gjakovë/Đakovica	11	11	9	decrease ▼
Ferizaj/Uroševac	12	14	12	no change
Pejë/Peć	11	11	13	increase ▲
Mitrovicë e Jugut/Južna Mitrovica (Mitrovica South)	12	13	10	decrease ▼

Source: GAP Institute, data extracted from the annual reports of MLGA on the performance of municipalities in Kosovo (2022, 2023, and 2024), annual reports on the transparency of municipal decision-making, records of Municipal Assembly meetings, as well as annual performance reports of the respective municipal assemblies.

The second indicator assesses the number of acts adopted by Municipal Assemblies in the seven municipalities. In total, the number of regulations adopted across all municipalities was 26 in 2022, 35 in 2023, and 10 in 2024. This indicates that 2023 recorded a notable increase of 9 regulations, or approximately 34.6% more than in 2022. In contrast, 2024 shows a sharp decline, with only 10 regulations adopted, which is about 61.5% fewer than in 2022 and around 71.4% fewer than in 2023.

Regarding decisions, the total number was 540 in 2022, 477 in 2023, and 442 in 2024. Unlike regulations, decisions did not increase after 2022 but instead show a gradual decline. From 2022 to 2023, the decrease was 63 decisions, or 11.7%, while from 2022 to 2024 the decrease reached 98 decisions, or 18%. This finding is central to the research question. If increased remuneration were expected to improve measurable productivity, one would anticipate an increase in the number of adopted acts. However, with the exception of the Municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac, which recorded an increase in the number of adopted decisions, the overall trend makes it difficult to argue that the increase in remuneration has led to a sustained improvement in engagement and institutional dynamics at the municipal level when measured through this indicator.

**Figure 7. Number of legal acts adopted by Municipal Assemblies in seven municipalities, by period 2022–2024.**




Source: GAP Institute, data extracted from the annual reports of MLGA on the performance of municipalities in Kosovo (2022, 2023, and 2024), annual reports on the transparency of municipal decision-making, records of Municipal Assembly meetings, as well as annual performance reports of the respective municipal assemblies.

The data show that the total duration of Municipal Assembly meetings across the seven municipalities analyzed remained almost unchanged immediately after the increase in remuneration, rising from 285 hours in 2022 before the increase to 286 hours in 2023 after the increase, representing only one additional hour. This indicates that, at an aggregate level, the dynamics or engagement measured through the duration of meetings did not demonstrate a meaningful increase in the first year following the salary reform. In 2024, however, the total declined to approximately 271 hours, which is 15 hours less than in 2023, around 5.2% lower, and 14 hours less than in 2022, around 4.9% lower. If meeting duration is taken as an indicator of work intensity, this reflects an overall decline.

When disaggregated by municipality, the duration of meetings in Prishtinë/Priština increased slightly from 77 hours in 2022 to 80 hours in 2023, but declined to 72 hours in 2024, which is lower than the 2022 level. In Prizren, the total duration of meetings shows a continuous decline, from 49 hours in 2022 to 47 hours in 2023, and further to 44 hours in 2024. Similar downward trends in meeting duration are observed in Gjilan/Gnjilane, Pejë/Peć, and Mitrovicë e Jugut/Južna Mitrovica/Mitrovica South. These trends are clearly negative and do not align with the expectation that increased remuneration would be accompanied by greater work intensity.

By contrast, in Gjakovë/Đakovica and Ferizaj/Uroševac, a more noticeable increase is observed, with meeting duration showing a consistent upward trend over the three-year period.

**Figure 8.** Duration of Municipal Assembly meetings in seven municipalities by year, calculated in hours.



Source: GAP Institute, data processed and verified from the records of Municipal Assembly sessions, session transcripts, and archived recordings of broadcasts from the official Municipal Assembly YouTube channels. In the case of the Municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac, access to official data was also requested due to the inability to open materials published on the official website.

When these three indicators are considered together, a more comprehensive picture of the 2022–2024 period emerges. The year 2022 serves as a baseline under conditions of lower remuneration, while 2023 and 2024 are assumed to reflect the period following the increase in remuneration for assembly members. If the underlying hypothesis is that higher remuneration should lead to increased institutional dynamics, then an upward trend would be expected across all three indicators: more meetings, more adopted acts, and longer working hours.

However, findings at the municipal level across these three indicators show that in most of the seven municipalities analyzed, no significant improvement in performance is observed. On the contrary, in many cases, performance appears weaker than in 2022, when the remuneration of assembly members was significantly lower.

## Conclusion

The assessment of the effects of the entry into force of the Law on Salaries in the Public Sector in 2023, examined in the context of the performance of municipal assemblies in seven major municipalities in Kosovo, shows that changes in remuneration have not automatically translated into a sustained improvement in institutional performance. Although the rationale behind increased remuneration assumes that improved economic conditions would enable greater focus on the representative function and lead to higher levels of engagement, comparable data across years indicate that work dynamics have produced either partial results or outcomes similar to those observed during the period when remuneration for municipal assembly members was significantly lower.

With regard to the number of meetings, most of the analyzed municipalities recorded either fewer meetings or the same number of meetings compared to 2022, when assembly members were remunerated at approximately 200 euros per month. In aggregate terms, following the baseline year of 2022 with 81 meetings held, an increase is observed in 2023 with 91 meetings, but in 2024 the number declines to 85, approaching again the levels observed prior to the salary reform. This trend suggests that the increase in activity observed in the first year following the salary reform may have been temporary and not necessarily the result of increased remuneration. Similarly, the total duration of meetings reinforces the absence of a sustained positive trend, increasing marginally from 285 hours in 2022 to 286 hours in 2023, before declining to 271 hours in 2024. In other words, even where a nominal increase is observed in 2023, it is minimal, while the decline in 2024 is more pronounced and clearly visible.

In the normative and decision-making dimension, the findings are even less supportive of a direct link between increased remuneration and improved institutional dynamics. The number of regulations increases from 26 in 2022 to 35 in 2023, but then drops significantly to 10 in 2024, indicating not only a lack of consistency but also a weakening of the regulatory component in the second year following the reform. Meanwhile, decisions follow a declining trajectory throughout the post-reform period, from 540 decisions in 2022 to 477 in 2023 and 442 in 2024. This continuous downward trend challenges the assumption that improved remuneration would automatically lead to increased output or stronger institutional dynamics.

Certainly, the performance of municipal assemblies is not determined solely by the level of remuneration, but by a combination of institutional, procedural, and political factors, which may outweigh the motivational effect of financial compensation.

Overall, this year over year assessment shifts the discussion from expectations and perceptions toward the measurement of verifiable outcomes, placing the salary reform in relation to concrete indicators of institutional activity. Within the limits of the data used and the comparative approach between 2022 and 2023–2024, the main conclusion is that increased remuneration does not appear to have acted as a driver of sustained and consistent improvements in the measurable performance of municipal assemblies. Nevertheless, it remains important for future analysis to examine the performance of assembly members individually, in order to assess whether more pronounced differences can be observed.




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